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Introduction 
Contemporary conflicts have become more transnational, protracted, 
irregular, and resistance-centric.1 They can be best described as protracted 
internal conflicts with multiple state actors and non-state actors intervening 
much like the multidimensional hybrid operational environment discussed in 
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022.2  
 
This article aims to explain how to harness the emerging strategic utility of 
non-state actors by utilizing well-established bodies of knowledge on 
resistance dynamics. This objective is based upon the observation that an 
increasing number of external state actors overtly or covertly intervene in 
intrastate conflicts by exploiting the environment’s resistance potential in 
order to increase their respective strategic influence.3 Similarly, both internal 
and external non-state actors take advantage of interstate conflicts or political 
instability stemming from failing states. The current conflicts in Iraq and 
Syria certainly meet this characterization; as do those in Ukraine, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Libya. More state actors are supporting or 
sponsoring political movements in intrastate conflict, making the termination 
of fighting very difficult. For instance, the resilience of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is largely attributed to the protracted Syrian civil 
war in which regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all 
sponsor local movements. In addition, external non-state actors such as ISIL, 
al-Nusra, and Hezbollah are also deeply involved in the conflict. In other 
words, these current conflicts represent a sample of a larger shift in warfare. 
As of this writing, Uppsala University’s world conflict data program compiles 
40 conflicts in the world for 2014. All but one of them are intrastate conflicts 
and 13 of them are internationalized.4 In short, state actors are actively 
leveraging and taking advantage of the resistance potential of groups engaged 
in civil conflicts.  
 
Understanding Current Conflicts 
The United States must adapt to this operational environment in order to 
help achieve national policy objectives. Key to this goal is a shared problem 
                                                     
1 Glenn Johnson & Doowan Lee, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to 
Unconventional Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December, 2014.  
2 U.S. Army, ARSOF 2022, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 2013, 3. 
3 Note that internal conflicts can be a civil war or an internal political confrontation or 
both. 
4 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/accessed July 28, 2015.  
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identification that will lead to mitigation and reduction of the fog and friction 
inherent in a hybrid operational environment. Problem identification begins 
with understanding how external groups are leveraging and harnessing the 
resistance potential of organic movements toward their respective strategic 
interests. By understanding how resistance potential is shaped toward 
strategic objectives, we can also better determine how to replicate the best 
practices of supporting and sponsoring robust organic movements.  
 
In order to fight successfully in this complex hybrid environment, a deep 
understanding of resistance dynamics is critical. Without understanding 
resistance dynamics, it becomes next to impossible to identify who is working 
with adversarial state actors and how their non-state surrogates gain political 
support against our own strategic interests. Our recent unsuccessful attempt 
at building a surrogate force in Syria is a good reminder of why it matters to 
harness the utility of organic resistance. Instead of building a sustainable 
movement with an armed wing, we thought a program designed to train and 
equip a few dozen commandos would suffice.5 This article intends to delineate 
the strategic dynamics of resistance and discuss the utility of resistance as a 
strategic tool.  
 
The article begins with a discussion of how resistance is conceptualized in 
doctrinal and academic terms to distill the essential characteristics of the 
concept. Then I will highlight three aspects of resistance: antecedent 
conditions, mechanisms, and effects. I will identify what antecedent 
conditions facilitate resistance followed by a variety of mechanisms employed 
by movements to exploit the conditions. The discussion of mechanisms 
accompanies a description of the effects that can be expected when 
movements take advantage of these conditions. The article concludes with a 
discussion of some of the essential traits associated with effective resistance 
in highly repressive environments. 
 
This article is mostly informed by social movement theory and collective 
action theory. Other disciplines also address resistance. However, political 
sociology offers the deepest insights into internationalized civil wars and 
resistance given its disciplinary focus on revolutionary, resistance, and 
insurgent dynamics. The article offers a broad overview of the 
multidisciplinary resistance literature as opposed to an in-depth case study of 
                                                     
5 For a good discussion on why the surrogate force was so ineffective, see David Maxwell, 
“Why the New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and Unconventional Warfare, War on the 
Rock: http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-new-syrian-army-failed-washington-
and-unconventional-warfare/ accessed on August 20, 2015.  
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a single resistance movement. The main purpose is to distill commonly 
established and empirically validated patterns and mechanisms of resistance. 
The terms “resistance” and “insurgency” interchangeably throughout. Given 
how extensively organic movements have been utilized by external actors, 
one’s resistance movement is frequently another’s insurgency.6 Pragmatism 
guides this article; it aims to learn the best practices from all forms of robust 
movements regardless of their political orientation. 
 
What is a Resistance Movement?  
In order to harness the utility of resistance, this article begins with some 
definitions, both doctrinal and academic. The Department of Defense defines 
a resistance movement as “an organized effort by some portion of the civil 
population of a country to resist the legally established government or an 
occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”7 In political science 
or sociology, resistance is notoriously difficult to define due to its 
multidisciplinary nature. It can arguably range from armed guerillas to 
symbolic gestures depending on which academic discipline defines it.8 
Because of this diversity, I use a broad academic definition of resistance in 
order to avoid a potential bias: “[collective and] active efforts to oppose, fight, 
and refuse to cooperate with or submit to … abusive behavior and…control.”9 
We can infer three shared characteristics from the definitions: organization, 
civilian components, and disruption or coercion against some authority.  
Unfortunately, these definitions offer little on how to recognize resistance 
potential and leverage it toward a strategic objective. This is where social 
movement theory can inform us of the process of resistance. Based on the 
political process model developed by Douglas McAdam, we can approach 
resistance from three different angles: antecedent conditions, mechanisms, 
and effects.10 This is a very useful way to think about resistance as the 
synthesis helps us understand what one should include to develop a 
                                                     
6 For a good large-N statistical analysis of external support for armed groups, see Zeec 
Maoz and Belgiin San-Akca, “Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups 
(NAGs), 1947-2001, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2012. One of their 
findings is that supporting only armed groups tends to prolong and complicate intrastate 
conflicts.  
7 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 2010 
(as amended through 15 June 2015), p. 206.  
8 For a detailed discussion how each discipline defines resistance, see Hollandder and 
Einonhner, “Conceptualizing Resistance” Sociological Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4. 
9 Profitt, 1996: 25 from Hollandder and Einonhner, “Conceptualizing Resistance” 
Sociological Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4. 
10 Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970, University of Chicago Press, 1982.  
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resistance movement. That is, the United States should understand what 
conditions to factor in, what activities to support, and what effects can be 
expected toward the end-state.  
 
Figure 1: Social Movement Approach to Resistance Dynamics 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts typical processes in the development of resistance 
movements. They are organized in three categories: conditions, mechanisms, 
and effects. The utility of these categories is threefold. First, there is much 
confusion about what factors promote robust resistance, often conflating what 
is available in the environment with what activities should be emphasized. 
Second, little discussion exists on what effects external actors can facilitate 
with and through surrogate movements. Without understanding recurring 
links between conditions, mechanisms, and effects, it is almost impossible to 
confidently support resistance elements. Figure 1 clarifies some of the 
confusion and suggests what to look for, what to do, and what to achieve to 
support a robust resistance movement. The categories represent broad factors 
and should not be understood as specific prescriptions.  
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Conditions  
Antecedent conditions are independent of any other explanatory variable.11 
An antecedent condition can be defined as “a phenomenon whose presence 
activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis.” 12 In essence, 
antecedent conditions are locally available ingredients that can be enhanced 
or amplified through active mechanisms toward robust resistance. In order to 
support resistance then, it is critical that intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield begin by analyzing what conditions exist in the operational 
environment.  
 
Social movement theory suggests four major types of antecedent conditions: 
political, economic, social, and informational. Political conditions can be 
factions within the regime or the existence of political opposition groups. 
Such political groups might be formal or informal. In addition, nonpolitical 
entities can also expand political opportunities for resistance movements. For 
instance, Jerzy Popieluszko was instrumental in providing political legitimacy 
to the Polish opposition movement and Solidarity. Popieluszko was a Catholic 
priest who routinely delivered anti-communist sermons and gave both 
religious and nationalist speeches in support of Solidarity. His sermons 
mobilized such a broad segment of the Polish population that the regime had 
him assassinated in 1984. Ironically his martyrdom immensely expanded 
political opportunities for the opposition movement.  
 
Religious leaders creating political opportunities for resistance movements 
are not uncommon. Cardinal Jaime Sin of the Philippines was able to turn the 
tide in 1986 when the first “people’s power” movement managed to oust 
Ferdinand Marcos.13 Marcos ordered his military to crush the opposition 
movement supporting Corazon Aquino, widow of the assassinated senator 
Benigno Aquino Jr. Cardinal Sin immediately issued a statement urging 
Catholics to go out and protect the protesters from the troops who had been 
ordered to shoot.14 Similarly, Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador gave a 
great deal of political legitimacy to political opposition groups such as the 
Democratic Revolutionary Front and the Farabundo Marti National 
                                                     
11 Henry E. Brady & David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004, p. 274.  
12 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell 
University Press, 1997, pp. 9-10.  
13 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic 
of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 160-2.  
14 Ibid., p. 161.  
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Liberation Front (FMLN).15 His support for resistance groups opposing the El 
Salvadoran regime was so powerful that he too was assassinated. At his 
funeral, more than 100,000 mourners gathered demanding both land and 
political reforms.16 The FMLN’s guerilla force was still very weak and unable 
to mount effective offensives against the government. The army fired on the 
mourners, killing dozens. This massacre quickly became a mobilizing 
narrative for opposition groups. In fact, the assassination of Romero drove 
many sympathizers and nonviolent activists to actively support and join the 
FMLN guerrillas.17  
 
Elections provide unique political opportunities for resistance. The overthrow 
of Slobodan Milosevic took place right after the rigged presidential election of 
2000. Marcos was also overthrown following the 1986 snap election in the 
Philippines where the appearance of election fraud was quickly utilized for 
mobilization. Cardinal Ricardo Vidal almost immediately made a statement 
condemning the apparent election irregularities. Where elections are used as 
a tool of political legitimation, resistance potential follows. The key is to 
maintain continuously updated information about political events and 
elections in countries of interest. Even draconian regimes tend to allow 
elections if only to achieve international legitimacy. This provides a unique 
opportunity to map the political landscape of the regime.  
 
Certain economic conditions are highly associated with the onset of resistance 
movements. However, not all robust resistance movements are attributable to 
economic downturns. Typically, conditions often linked with the onset of 
resistance include income inequalities, under-employment, unemployment, 
inflation, or income stagnation. Note that it is often external shocks that 
trigger the exacerbation of these conditions. Economic measures taken by 
external actors can create a more conducive environment for organic 
resistance.18  
 
Ungoverned or under-regulated economics can also provide opportunities for 
resistance groups to generate resources to sustain themselves. These 
unsanctioned economic areas typically have built in informal or autonomous 
channels of resource extraction and redistribution. The autonomy of the 
                                                     
15 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 197.  
16 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 26-27.  
17 Ibid., p. 105. 
18 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special 
Warfare Magazine, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2013, p. 30.  
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Bazaar in Iran was a major factor during the Iranian revolution of 1979.19 The 
Bazaar provided much needed resources to key organizers of the resistance 
when the regime cut subsidies and stipends to students and academics.20  
 
Economic conditions themselves are rarely sufficient for resistance to emerge 
or to take hold. While economic conditions throughout the Middle East were 
generally comparable in the 1980s and 1990s, insurgent movements emerged 
in only a few select countries.21 While all major macroeconomic indicators 
were comparable in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia between 
1980 and 1992, only the first two countries experienced major insurgent 
movements. This reflects the explanatory poverty of the classical model of 
resistance which links collective action directly to individual psychological 
conditions.  
 
Several flawed assumptions explain the limited analytic value of the classical 
model.22 First, it is almost impossible to observe and measure individual 
psychological conditions in order to see how they may impact resistance, 
especially in less than fully developed countries. Second, even if such 
conditions were observable, the classical model offers no causal mechanisms 
to link the assumed individual psychological disequilibrium with collective 
mobilization. It just offers a leap of faith between individual psychology and 
collective action. Thus, Fearon and Laitin show with their empirical analysis 
of the Minority at Risk dataset that ethnic divides or grievances alone rarely 
explain the intensity or duration of civil wars.23 In fact, they provide statistical 
evidence that the outbreak of intrastate conflicts cannot be explained by the 
strength of political grievances. This is not a trivial finding given how popular 
the notion of grievance is in the common understanding of insurgent 
dynamics. Third, the antiquated classical theory of insurgency cannot explain 
how resistance can take place in developed countries.  
 
Individual grievances do play a role in the development of resistance. The 
question is how. Typically, grievances become instrumental when they are 
exploited and framed by groups or networks actively seeking to create 
                                                     
19 Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in 
Iran,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: a Social Movement Theory 
Approach, Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 187-9.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 10-16.  
22 For an example of how structural strains are inadequately used to explain revolutionary 
movements, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Stanford University Press, 
1966.  
23 James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003.  
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opportunities for collective mobilization. For the special operations forces 
(SOF) community to harness resistance potential, then, the focus should be 
on both the existing conditions and the activities of political actors. This is in 
essence what Emirbayer and Goodwin call the problem of agency, warning of 
the false promise of structural determinism.24 In other words, one cannot 
properly leverage resistance unless potential (antecedent conditions) is 
understood in the context of agency (purposeful activities).  
 
Socioethnic divides and existing dissident networks provide great potential 
for resistance. In particular, external actors can leverage such conditions to 
establish a robust organizational platform. It is no coincidence that most 
robust resistance movements emerge from pre-existing ties and networks. 
These pre-existing ties typically have built-in mechanisms to coordinate 
information and action across civil society. Ethnic divides can be a powerful 
fault-line to promote resistance initially. However, an isolated group can be 
an easy target for the regime to marginalize and vilify. The SOF community 
must pay attention to what network resources socioethnic groups can 
contribute to the creation of broad coalitions of resistance movements as 
opposed to just relying on a single subgroup.  
 
Ideological conditions refer to existing grievances stemming from economic 
disparities or structural strains such as income inequalities, unemployment, 
underemployment, or discrimination. In essence, these conditions often stem 
from social, economic, or political strains. They also include existing norms of 
collective action and violence that can be utilized to justify mobilizing large 
groups for resistance. For instance, a sense of victimization is often used by 
Islamists to justify jihad.25 Typically, insurgents will try to align their ideology 
with socially accepted themes of dissent.26 Instead of treating resistance 
ideology as a monolithic worldview, it is more useful to approach it as a set of 
grievances specifically framed to motivate and justify collective action.  
 
Causal Mechanisms and Effects 
Mechanisms refer to the causal links between antecedent conditions and 
outcome variables. In the social sciences, a causal mechanism is defined as 
“physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal 
                                                     
24 Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of 
Agency, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6, 1994.  
25 David A. Snow & Scott C. Bryd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist 
Movements, Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2006.  
26 David A. Snow & et al, “Frame Alignment Processes. Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1986, pp. 467-76.  
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capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer 
energy, information, or matter to other entities.”27 Translated to the concept 
of resistance, causal mechanisms are the activities and techniques used by 
insurgents or activists to exploit and accelerate the antecedent conditions for 
resistance purposes. Effects, then, are the outcomes insurgents intend to 
accomplish by exploiting the conditions through a variety of mechanisms.  
 
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) recently released a 
concept paper that emphasizes cultivating soldiers “with the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities to understand and influence human actions and 
activities.”28 The same concept paper stresses the need to link these activities 
to creating desired effects in the human domain.29 Understanding how 
mechanisms are related to effects is not only academically useful, but also 
operationally relevant to the human domain.  
 
Conversion/Co-optation and Effects 
When opposition political groups support a resistance movement, the latter 
typically gains legitimacy quickly. This legitimacy can also be used to gain 
support from the population. For the movement, this is perhaps the quickest 
path to leveraging existing groups to elevate its political appeal. As Robert 
Helvey demonstrates, conversion is a powerful mechanism to transform 
potential political fractures into resistance.30 He notes that the Serbian 
opposition movement was able to oust Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, even 
though the regime possessed much more powerful coercive means, because 
some of the Serbian police and bureaucrats withdrew their loyalty.31 In 
essence, regime sympathizers were converted to support the opposition 
movement.  
 
Conversion is the process by which the movement signals to the pillars of 
regime support that they will be disenfranchised by the movement.32 The 
movement will work with some regime elements to either facilitate or stabilize 
the eventual transfer of political authority. This is a different way to establish 
                                                     
27 Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 
2005, p.137.  
28 Operating in the Human Domain, Version 1.0, United States Special Operations 
Command, Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 38.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Robert L. Helevey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the 
Fundamentals, Albert Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2004.  
31 Ibid., pp. 26-8.  
32 Ibid.  
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auxiliary and underground networks for resistance. Instead of creating 
purpose-built networks from elements outside of the ruling coalition, the logic 
of conversion would prescribe identifying moderate or disgruntled factions 
within the power structures of the regime. Resistance can be considered as a 
zero-sum political game where one defection or acquiescence means a twofold 
gain for the movement and a twofold loss to the regime. From this perspective 
the benefits of conversion become clear compared to those of building 
external resistance networks to match the regime’s coercive capacity.  
 
However, internal conversion and external network building are not mutually 
exclusive mechanisms. Rather, they should be considered complimentary 
processes designed to leverage political fractures. Conversion can also be used 
in the steady state. A political claim made by the resistance movement can 
gain popular support if an existing political party or influential dissidents also 
endorse it. The interests of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in 
Lebanese politics are often advanced in this way by Hezbollah, thus achieving 
a synthesis between strategic resistance networks and smaller operational 
networks.  
 
Chenoweth and Stephen also confirm this relationship with their qualitative 
and statistical analysis of regime-change campaigns.33 While civil resistance 
methods are statistically correlated with successful resistance movements, the 
likelihood of such success is heavily influenced by the magnitude of 
defectors.34 Several causal mechanisms warrant further explanation. First, 
regime defectors can greatly enhance the perceived viability of the resistance 
movement. In 1986, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of 
Staff Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos in the Philippine Army used the 
Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) to support the political 
opposition movement in the Philippines.35 With the Catholic Church’s 
backing and Aquino’s street demonstrations gaining momentum, the RAM 
proved to be a key element of the movement’s success.36 
 
Second, regime defectors can deliver critical intelligence to the movement. 
Such intelligence can be utilized to send surgical signals to other fence-sitters 
that the movement poses no threat to them or siding with the regime will 
                                                     
33 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic 
of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011.  
34 Ibid., pp. 48-51.  
35 Felipe B. Miranda ed, Democratization: Philippine Perspectives, University of the 
Philippines Press, 1998, p. 34-35.  
36 Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, pp. 133-9.  
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harm their future position. Defection can also be subtle and nonphysical. 
Endorsements from existing political groups can be powerful catalysts as well.  
 
Third, regime defectors typically can bring subordinates and equipment to the 
movement, which tend to be resource-poor, especially in the beginning. In the 
steady state, existing political groups can provide wider access to the 
movement with their communication platforms and constituency networks. 
In short, conversion is a critical mechanism to consider given how resource 
intensive it can be to build an effective resistance movement that can 
withstand the regime’s superior coercive power from scratch.  
 
Growing evidence suggests that conversion was one of the main mechanisms 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used to expand both in Syria 
and Iraq. In Iraq, Lina Khatib demonstrates how ISIL co-opted existing Sunni 
tribes to accelerate its expansion.37 The rapid fall of Mosul can be partially 
explained by conversion in that Sunni police and soldiers had little reason to 
fight due to Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki’s systemic persecution of the 
Sunni population. ISIL continued to make local alliances to accelerate its pace 
of expansion. In Syria, ISIL essentially rehired civil servants and teachers to 
maintain control of areas under their control as long as they agreed to use 
ISIL’s ideology.38  
 
To summarize, the effect of conversion can be profound. It can establish 
broad political legitimacy for the resistance movement. It can help the 
movement leverage or pool resources with existing organic institutions to 
accelerate its pace of growth. Most importantly, it can help the resistance 
movement become very hard for the regime to repress as such oppression is 
more likely to trigger a political backlash. This is what Gene Sharp calls 
“political Jiu-jitsu,” which he defines as a process through which violent 
repression is exploited to elevate the legitimacy of resistance and thus garner 
popular support.39  
 
Resource-Generation and Effects 
Resistance is not cheap. It requires a wide variety of activities to gain popular 
support and maintain access to the population. These activities include 
information campaigns, publications, public demonstrations, and cultural 
                                                     
37 Lina Khatib, The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and Expanding, Carnegie Middle 
East Center, June 2015, pp. 6-11.  
38 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
39 Gene Sharp, How Nonviolent Struggle Works, Albert Einstein Institution, Harvard 
University, 2013, pp. 112-5. 
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and educational events, to name just a few. Self-sufficiency is, therefore, a 
critical requirement for any resistance movement. State actors can easily use 
official and financial means to starve dissident groups. Audits are frequently 
used to suppress dissident groups of financial resources. It is no surprise that 
robust resistance movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah sustain 
themselves with a variety of legal and illegal financial and commercial 
enterprises.  
 
It is convenient to think that external actors can greatly help the movement by 
providing the required resources to finance various activities. However, there 
is a big caveat: the success of resistance largely depends on its perceived 
legitimacy. No matter how secretive external support can be, just a single 
exposure can completely rob the movement of authenticity and legitimacy—
this single point of failure is something the planner should be very careful 
about.  
 
Successful resistance movements generally develop their own internal 
mechanisms to generate resources in order to avoid being perceived as a 
puppet of outside influence. Otpor, a Serbian resistance movement, is famous 
for using creative ways of generating its own resources, such as street games 
mocking then Serbian president Milosevic. Other movements also employ 
fund-raising events. Memorial services are a good example of events used by a 
wide variety of resistance movements. Setting up charities that accept 
donations from international actors is another example. Another mechanism 
is nesting the movement within existing groups that have built-in 
mechanisms of collecting and distributing membership fees for services. 
However, these movements use the resources to develop self-sustaining 
platforms instead of just focusing on acquiring kinetic capabilities. One of the 
first activities of Hezbollah was collecting trash, and since then, it has 
established diverse new social institutions, ranging from schools to hospitals.  
 
The tree army in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, is another example of a 
dissident group with humble beginnings. It started as an agricultural 
development project led by the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell 
(NRCC), working under Task Force Mountain Warrior (TFMW), and it 
quickly became a self-sustaining resistance movement against the Taliban.40 
Key to its success was the NRCC’s emphasis on imparting economic skills and 
                                                     
40 Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber 
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codes of honor to Afghan partners, which in turn propped up the perceived 
legitimacy and viability of the movement.41 Trainees were recruited only from 
respected families. And by working with one of the best agricultural 
departments in Afghanistan, the partners managed to provide essential skills 
and services to their home villages. Once the tree army was sufficiently 
developed, its network was able to drive insurgents out of the area by 
establishing itself as a legitimate resistance movement against the insurgency 
and taking over timbering from the Taliban. Illegal timbering and smuggling 
lumber was one of the most profitable illegal activities financing the Taliban 
in Kunar Province.42 By far, the tree army remains one of the most successful 
and self-sustaining resistance movements supported by the U.S. against the 
Taliban.  
 
Bloc Recruitment, Mass Mobilization, and Effects 
Mass mobilization mechanisms for resistance differ from individual 
recruitment. The pace of growth and the scale of growth must be achieved 
concurrently as weak movements can be easily controlled or even co-opted by 
the regime. This is why successful movements have empirically employed a 
specific mobilization mechanism called bloc recruitment. Individual 
recruitment and bloc recruitment are not mutually exclusive. The argument of 
this article is to complement existing mechanisms with historically 
reoccurring patterns of successful resistance movements.  
 
Brokers who organically connect structurally disjointed groups in order to 
facilitate bloc recruitment play an irreplaceable role. Shin-Kap Hand provides 
a detailed account of how the American revolutionaries overcame internal 
stratification against the British Empire.43 Paul Revere and Joseph Warren 
were not in leadership positions, but they provided the critical connective 
tissue between the thinkers and the doers of the American Revolution.44 
Similarly, single members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party 
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) in the 1920s and 
                                                     
41 Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber 
Exploitation and Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of Afghanistan: A 
Case Study Describing the Nexus Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Communities 
Within the Forest Sector, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013, pp. 347-
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42 Ibid., pp. 333-4.  
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the American Revolution,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, 
2009.  
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1930s were instrumental to the rapid expansion of the movement.45 The 
primary function of the single members was to identify key influencers in 
existing networks and organizations in order to bring them under the NSDAP 
in a wholesale fashion. In other words, they were mobile brokers focusing on 
bloc recruitment.  
 
A similar pattern of network development was observed in Poland in the 
1970s and 1980s. Early members of Polish anti-communist opposition 
realized that isolated student activism was not sufficient to challenge the 
communist regime. Their resistance was well organized but quickly 
suppressed by the regime’s divide and conquer tactics as students were 
framed as over-privileged troublemakers. Realizing this failure, Adam 
Michnik established civic organizations such as the Workers Defense 
Committee in Poland (Komitet Obrony Robotnikkow, KOR) and the Society 
of Scientific Studies (Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych, TKN) in order to 
connect Solidarity with other clusters of resistance that did not necessarily 
align with each other.46 KOR was not an overtly political organization. Its 
mission was to provide legal assistance and support for jailed demonstrators 
and their families.47 TKN was a mobile educational program. In practice, it 
was called the Flying University where academics and cultural figures 
organized dispersed events to discuss sensitive topics such as Polish national 
literature.48  
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Figure 2: Polish Opposition Network, 1980/198149 
 
The perceived neutrality of civil brokers was perhaps the single most 
important organizational innovation that key leaders engineered through trial 
and error. Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik learned in the 1970s that focused 
yet unconnected resistance could be easily neutralized by the regime’s divide 
and conquer strategy. The success of Solidarity in the 1980s in replacing the 
Polish communist regime cannot be explained without taking into account the 
role of civic networks specifically founded to coordinate and manage a broad 
coalition of dissident and existing subgroups. In other words, the notion of 
solidarity was built into the overall resistance landscape. 
 
Similar dynamics were also observed in Italy during the formation of 
clandestine political militancy in the 1970s. Donatella della Porta 
meticulously shows that most dedicated members of the Red Brigades, the 
Proletarian Armed Groups, the Front Line, the Communist Fighting 
Formations, and a few other minor clandestine groups came from existing 
political groups and associations through interpersonal ties.50 What della 
Porta empirically shows is that overt networks and affiliations play the role of 
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a large pool composed of potential recruits who can be mobilized through 
existing and multiple personal ties into a more selective and cohesive 
subgroup. The magnitude of trust-based ties built and sustained in routine 
overt political organizations predicts the level of commitment expressed by 
those who joined the underground militant groups.51  
 
In sum, the United States must learn how to identify and assess the potential 
of organic brokers in order to facilitate bloc recruitment. Learning about 
relational dynamics among and across existing networks is critical and is not 
a trivial matter. Relational information is qualitatively different from 
individual attributes in that the latter are used to recruit individuals, while the 
former informs the planner about how heterogeneous groups and networks 
converge or diverge along different political issues. Understanding those fault 
lines can be a critical factor in expanding the scope of mobilization.  
 
Framing, Messaging, and Effects  
Perhaps the most effective mechanism to achieve a rapid rate of bloc 
recruitment is strategic framing. Strategic framing is the process by which the 
movement combines grievances with political arguments regarding three 
frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Instead of merely 
reproducing existing individual grievances, strategic framing provides 
interpretive schemes designed to induce a shared conciousness for collective 
action. In fact, SOCOM stresses the need to understand and adopt culturally 
relevant messaging themes in order to localize information operations.52 If 
political or economic dissatisfaction is the ingredient of collective action, then 
strategic framing is the catalyst. Snow and Benford provide four specific 
mechanisms of this alignment process: bridging, amplification, extension, 
and transformation.53  
 
Frame bridging is how individual conditions are bridged to a structural 
issue.54 For instance, while personal poverty may be a common economic 
condition, it can bridge to regime incompetence, corruption, or nepotism. The 
youth bulge that was exacerbated by the global recession was blamed on the 
corrupt and nepotistic regimes in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. In 
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many ways, the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Buazizi 
captured and collectivized a widespread individual grievance of economic 
inequality. It was not an isolated incident, but was framed as a symptom of 
deep-seeded structural issues affecting many like Buazizi.  
 
Frame amplification is the technique designed to imbue the bridging frame 
with an active sense of agency by invoking resonating social or religious 
norms.55 For instance, it can be framed that college graduates are under-
employed or unemployed not because of a structural economic strain, but 
because the regime is actively skimming the benefits of national resources. It 
is well documented that ISIL and its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq consistently 
used targeted violence to amplify the latent sectarian tension between Sunni 
and Shia populations.56 By accentuating and exacerbating the divide, ISIL has 
sought to mobilize and recruit disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis.57 Returning to 
the Arab Spring, the death of Buazizi in Tunisia and the murder of Khaled 
Said in Egypt were quickly amplified as state-sponsored campaigns of 
unbridled violence against the population.58 Incidents of violence were 
quickly utilized by existing movement networks in what Wendy Pearlman 
calls “microfoundations of uprising.”59 These incidents were reframed as 
moral judgments invoking the violation of shared norms, dignity, and life. 
Vilification is a common technique used for frame amplification.60 Vilification 
has two processes. First, it begins with a polarization process where 
competitors are lumped into a generic “other” category. Second, the “other” 
category is repeatedly associated with socially and culturally negative traits.61 
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In frame extension the normative judgment established with the 
amplification process is extended to various groups within the population.62 
That is, because the regime is actively defrauding the national economy for 
personal greed and to satisfy its “oligarchy,” it is not only college graduates 
but also the entire middle class that are suffering from poor economic 
conditions. In Tunisia, labor movements quickly seized the moment and 
organized nation-wide demonstrations showing solidarity. In Egypt, what 
started as an urban-based anti-Mubarak voice quickly became a national 
narrative about Egyptian national pride. By this process the claim of one 
group is extended to represent a broader set of social groups.  
 
Frame transformation is the process of revitalizing a perhaps stagnating 
ideology. An anti-regime narrative may need to be revamped in order to earn 
international support or recognition. Typically, the movement may invoke a 
“far enemy” to justify the need to work with external actors. It is no 
coincidence that Solidarity’s narrative aligned the Polish communist regime 
with the Soviet Union, just like Zawahiri went from the near enemy of the 
Egyptian state to the Far Enemy of the West. Perhaps this is where the Arab 
Spring failed to take advantage of the opening political opportunity of 
elections. The secular camps within the overall opposition coalition were not 
as well organized as the Muslim Brotherhood, thus failing to transform their 
“opposition narrative” to a “political narrative.” 
 
These are just a set of a few mechanisms typically employed by movements to 
transform individual grievances into a powerful ideology of political 
mobilization.63 Once a narrative is developed by codifying and disseminating 
it through print or online media, these mechanisms can sustain the 
movement very effectively. Even the current narrative of ISIL can be 
described in a similar fashion. While the genesis of ISIL is uniquely Iraqi 
Sunni, its information operations have adopted the narrative of the far enemy 
and vilification of the West to justify why foreigners should do whatever it 
takes to join the Caliphate and mobilize themselves to commit lone-wolf 
attacks on civilian targets.  
External support can play a critical role in enhancing the movement’s 
strategic framing. Recent research on the Arab Spring clearly indicates that 
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external media outlets can create an echo effect to elevate the salience of 
certain political themes and frames.64 Even if the regime shuts down social 
media or even the Internet, external communication and dissemination 
outside the country corresponds to elevated popular interest and support for 
resistance. In fact, this was not unique to the Arab Spring. Keck’s and 
Sikkink’s extensive case studies of transnational movements demonstrate how 
a political claim travels outside, amplified by external media outlets or 
epistemic communities, and then reenters the country of origin to empower 
the movement.65 They call this pattern of resistance growth the “boomerang” 
effect.66 Applied to resistance, an external supporter can surgically guide this 
well-established pattern to enhance the perceived viability of an organic 
opposition movement.  
 
Conclusion 
This article identifies critical conditions, mechanisms, and effects that can be 
utilized for supporting resistance movements. However, one environmental 
factor deserves additional attention. Given the definitions discussed earlier, it 
should be clear that modern resistance often takes place in politically austere 
environments. This means sponsoring resistance should factor in substantial 
measures of regime repression. Thus, it is necessary to examine some of the 
typical obstacles to sustained collective action in order to identify what traits 
to look for when looking for resistance movements to sponsor.  
 
A resistance movement challenging the government or occupying force is 
most likely to face a multitude of repressive efforts. Figure 3 represents a 
simple typology of state repression. While state repression can be categorized 
in multiple ways, typically it can be conceptualized by two factors: scope of 
repression and method of repression. Vertically it ranges from kinetic to non-
kinetic and, laterally, it ranges from collective to individual. Four types of 
repression are commonly used against opposition movements: leadership 
targeting, leadership cooptation, resource control, and delegitimation.67 This 
typology should work as a check list for planners to factor in what types of 
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support organic resistance movements would need in order to withstand 
regime repression and survive. 
 
When a resistance movement or insurgency challenges a regime, the latter 
will first try to remove the leaders by arresting or killing them. However, 
decapitation rarely leads to organizational collapse of insurgent or terrorist 
movements.68 When leadership targeting is not sufficient or successful, the 
regime will often employ resource control measures to starve the 
challengers.69 These include shutting down social institutions, audits, and 
financial sanctions. In addition, regimes will often try to divide and disrupt 
movements through nonlethal means. Such efforts include cooptation, 
infiltration, reintegration promises, and selective incentives.  
 
If a resistance movement is to succeed in coercing or disrupting its targeted 
regime, it becomes critical for the former to have organic capabilities that can 
be utilized to withstand and overcome state repression. Historically, 
movements typically acquire these capabilities by employing various non-
kinetic and nonviolent activities such as providing essential services and 
organizing public events to garner popular support.70 This is why this article 
highlights the processes used by insurgents to develop organic political 
support, resource independence, organizational resiliency, and ideological 
legitimacy. These processes can be found across different environments 
ranging from East and Central Asia to the Middle East.71 This resiliency often 
stems from a coalition of multiple networks. This multiplicity may carry an 
operational liability. However, it is the same factors that give resistance a 
diffused and broad “attribution” characteristic: repression on one is an attack 
on everyone. Social movement theory calls this mechanism the “repression 
backfire.”72  
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Figure 3: Simplified Typology of Repression 
 
The regime will typically have more coercive capacity than the resistance 
movement. It is common to think that lethal aid is what resistance needs to 
compete with the regime’s military and security forces. Lethal aid may prove 
effective against weakened or fragile regimes, but not against mature 
autocratic regimes such as North Korea, China, Iran, or Russia. Lethal 
assistance also carries a hefty political price.  
 
Social movement literature suggests that what enables the movement to 
compete effectively against the regime is not how well it fights with brute 
force, which is typically expressed as guerilla warfare. Rather, it is the 
political, economic, social, and ideological foundations built during the steady 
state that enable the movement to deflect regime repression and turn it into a 
rallying point.73 Resistance movements succeed when they can strategically 
employ both lethal and nonlethal methods instead of relying on a single 
strategy. When resistance movements are not balanced, they often lead to 
undesirable strategic consequences, such as was the case of the Nicaraguan 
Contras, where neither the surrogates nor the sponsor achieved their 
respective objective.74 If resistance is to be employed as a strategic tool for 
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advancing national security goals, the United States must carefully factor in 
the intricate dynamics between conditions, mechanisms, and effects. Tactics 
of guerilla warfare are no longer sufficient to inform us how to harness the 
strategic nature of resistance.  
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